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Abstract  
In the last decade, governments have begun more frequently cutting internet and mobile services 
as a response to real or potential threats. Both democratic and autocratic regimes use internet 
shutdowns to maintain security and suppress dissent. Why do governments intentionally shut down 
the internet? This paper focuses on complete blackouts of online communications, known as “kill-
switch” shutdowns, and examines the factors that contribute to a regime’s choice to enact such 
extreme measures. Using a mixed-methods analysis, this paper evaluates multiple potential causes 
of internet shutdowns. Results from both cross-national, quantitative analysis and qualitative 
process tracing present several findings. First, government internet shutdowns follow a strong path 
dependency: once a government enacts a shutdown, the chances they will do so again are high. 
Second, there is surprisingly no apparent link between violent protest and internet shutdowns. This 
thesis finds strong support, on the other hand, for violent conflict and competitive elections as 
factors that lead governments to shut down internet services. Finally, this paper finds a negative 
relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and internet shutdowns in the data, suggesting that 
greater linkages with the West may be a way to curb government-mandated internet shutdowns in 
the future. 
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1. Introduction 
 On January 27th, 2011, in response to widespread anti-government protest, Egypt’s 
internet went dark. Activists and journalists who had documented the protests in the center of 
Cairo and received worldwide support through Twitter lost the ability to connect and 
communicate. The internet had not been censored; it had been cut entirely. This was not the first 
time a country had cut off internet services in response to political unrest. Shutdowns of this kind 
had occurred in Nepal in 2005 and Myanmar in 2007. But Egypt’s response to the Arab Spring 
marked the first time the world had closely watched a revolution organized and executed online, 
and it was in this context that the world watched a government quickly and effectively snuff out 
a mode of communication and mobilization.  
 Since 2011, governments across the world have used internet “kill-switch” tactics to try 
to dampen protests, silence political opposition, and undercut armed rebellions. Despite this 
rapid growth in government-mandated internet shutdowns, there is little scholarly consensus on 
why and when governments shut down the internet. This paper aims to address these questions. 
The answers to these questions are of great importance as the internet continues to play a central 
role in the social, economic, and political lives of people around the world. In addition to 
implications for human rights and free speech, internet shutdowns can also have debilitating 
economic effects, especially with growing dependence on digital technology for global trade, 
services, and financial transactions. Internet shutdowns threaten democratization and harm 
governance, but the economic fallout poses its own threat to sustainable development as 
shutdowns become more commonplace.1 
 
1 Tonderayi Mukeredzi, “Uproar over Internet Shutdowns: Governments Cite Incitements to Violence, Exam 
Cheating, and Hate Speech,” Africa Renewal: Africa Section of the UN  Department of Public Information, August – 
November 2017, August 21, 2017, https://www.jpanafrican.org/docs/vol10no10/10.10-3-Mukeredzi.pdf 
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Despite a 2015 United Nations declaration that established Internet kill-switch shutdowns 
as violations of international human rights law, even in times of conflict,2 governments have not 
refrained from continuing to use them to curb protests and prevent opposition coordination 
around elections. In the last decade, a growing number of states, autocracies and democracies 
alike, have opted to conduct internet shutdowns instead of or in addition to internet filtering 
(content censorship) tactics. Only one internet kill-switch shutdown was recorded in 2011, but 
that number had risen to 173 by 2019.3 Table 1 on the following page provides an overview of 
countries that have enacted shutdowns in these years. Given the growing popularity of internet 
shutdowns as a policy option, as one scholar puts it, “today’s extreme case may become 
tomorrow’s typical case—or be surpassed by a more repressive regime intent on testing the 
effectiveness of frequent information blackouts.”4 
I argue in this thesis that certain factors may affect the willingness of governments to 
carry out a kill-switch shutdown, including conflict, protests, proximity to elections, population 
demographics, internet infrastructure, and international linkages with the United States. I first 
test these hypotheses through OLS regressions using a novel and detailed dataset of internet 
shutdowns from Access Now, an NGO that tracks internet censorship.5 I find ongoing armed 
conflict to be the strongest predictor of an internet shutdown in all my models; however, the 
occurrence of violent protest had surprisingly little effect. Competitive elections are associated 
with a higher number of internet shutdowns, but do not necessarily make them more likely to  
 
2 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression 
and responses to conflict situations,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, May 4, 
2015, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15921&Lang ID=E 
3 Deji Bryce Olukotun and Peter Micek, “Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP) Dataset,” Access Now 
and the #KeepItOn Coalition, Accessed February 2020. 
4 Jan Rydzak, “The Digital Dilemma in War and Peace: Determinants of Digital Network Shutdown in Non-
Democracies,” Under review, 2018. 
5 Olukotun and Micek, “Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP) Dataset,” 2020 
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Table 1. List of countries that have enacted kill-switch shutdowns by year. 
Country/Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Algeria     X  X  X 
Bahrain      X    
Bangladesh      X   X 
Benin         X 
Cameroon       X  X 
Chad        X  
China         X 
Cote D’Ivoire        X  
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
    X  X X X 
Ecuador         X 
Egypt X     X    
Equatorial Guinea       X   
Ethiopia      X  X X 
Gabon         X 
Gambia      X    
India  X X X X X X X X 
Indonesia         X 
Iran         X 
Iraq     X X  X X 
Liberia         X 
Malawi         X 
Malaysia     X     
Mauritania         X 
Myanmar         X 
Nicaragua        X  
Niger     X     
North Korea     X X    
Pakistan      X X X X 
Philippines     X  X   
Republic of Congo     X     
Russia         X 
Sierra Leone        X  
South Korea        X  
Sudan   X      X 
Syria  X    X X X X 
Tajikistan         X 
Togo     X     
Turkey      X    
Uganda      X    
Venezuela    X      
Yemen        X X 
Zimbabwe         X 
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occur. Conversely, while foreign aid from the United States makes shutdowns less likely in this 
sample, more foreign assistance does not appear to decrease the number of shutdowns for states 
already using them. Building from the cross-national analysis, I then turn to qualitative evidence 
to better understand the dynamic relationship conflict, protest, and prior competitive elections 
have on governments use of kill-switch shutdowns. 
My thesis contributes to the study of digital repression in two important ways. First, it 
advances the most systematic analysis to date of the determinants of kill-switch internet 
shutdowns over the last decade. Earlier scholars have studied internet shutdowns from 1985 to 
2011, but this thesis updates the body of scholarship on cross-national internet shutdowns by 
using Access Now’s dataset.6 This data is likely to bring new insights to the fore for two main 
reasons: first, because of the turning point for government-mandated internet shutdowns that 
occurred as the world watched Egypt go dark in 2011, and second, because of the explosion in 
internet and mobile phone access that has swept across the world in the last decade. At the start 
of the 2010s, the internet was still primarily a luxury of the developed world, but increasingly 
affordable cellular technology has made the internet was accessible to billions more people. 
Many low-income countries that previously lacked the infrastructure for fixed-line internet 
connections have ‘leapfrogged’ their way into twenty-first century technology, and this mobile 
phone revolution has doubtlessly changed the dynamics of online political behavior, popular 
mobilization, and governmental digital repression. This paper presents an updated study of 
internet shutdowns, utilizing data that is more representative of today’s global internet repression 
situation. Second, while Jan Rydzak’s cross-national study has pushed the envelope for studies 
of internet censorship, it has only examined determinants of network shutdowns in non-
 
6 P.N. Howard, S.D. Agarwal, and M.M. Hussain, “When do states disconnect their digital networks? Regime 
responses to the political uses of social media,” The Communication Review, 14(3) 2011, 216–232. 
9 
 
democracies. In the last decade, democratic states like India have become some of the most 
frequent regimes to shut off the internet for their citizens. Expanding the cross-national analysis 
to include democratic states will likely yield important new insights to the body of literature on 
internet censorship and repression. 
Second, this paper informs scholarship on the nexus between armed conflict and 
emerging information and communications technologies (ICTs). The strong connection between 
conflict and internet shutdowns is shown in case studies to be in part due to the ability of non-
state actors to utilize the internet to mobilize for violent collective action.  Shutdowns are shown 
to be a potent tool for reducing the ability of armed actors to communicate with each other and 
with an online audience. In states facing armed rebellions, internet shutdowns can also prevent 
the spread of information online that could threaten the political survival of the ruling regime. 
Finally, this paper also makes contributions to scholarly knowledge of repression more generally. 
Understanding why states are not utilizing internet kill-switch shutdowns in response to violent 
protest when we might expect them to opens further questions for scholars who examine 
contemporary dissent and repression.   
The rest of the thesis is as follows. After surveying the existing literature on internet 
shutdowns and the body of literature on international internet censorship, I situate the place of 
this study and its importance for bringing the study of internet kill-switch shutdowns into the 
present. Building off the extant literature, I present a theory of factors that might motivate 
governments to disconnect the internet and develop hypotheses for the relationships I expect to 
see between each of my independent variables and internet shutdowns. The paper then utilizes a 
mixed-methods approach to evaluate these hypotheses, moving from a large-N, cross-national 
analysis using OLS regression to small-n process tracing of the causal pathways in several cases. 
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The paper concludes with the implications of this work and avenues for future research. 
2. Conceptualizing Internet Shutdowns 
Internet kill-switch shutdowns are one of several potential tools that governments can use 
to control the flow of information online. This section reviews relevant literature on approaches 
states have taken to using information and communication technology (ICT) alongside societies. 
I then highlight the unique nature of kill-switch shutdowns and discuss why this form of internet 
censorship has become more common over time.  
2.1 The Digital Repression Toolkit 
 Before delving into the body of knowledge on state restrictions on ICT, it is important to 
conceptualize the practice of internet shutdowns vis-à-vis other tactics that governments use to 
restrict access to ICT. To define internet shutdowns, I adopt a definition commonly employed by 
other scholars in the field: “an intentional and complete disruption of fixed-line or mobile 
Internet, ordered pursuant to the authority of the state, that renders the Internet inaccessible or 
unusable for a specific population, often to exert control over the flow of information.”7 In 
particular, I focus on what are known as “kill-switch shutdowns,” in which the government turns 
off the entire internet—that is, blocks all access to fixed-line or mobile internet services, rather 
than blocking certain websites or applications or merely slowing down internet speeds. 
Internet shutdowns can be distinguished from other forms of digital government 
censorship. States have pursued a number of tactics to block access to information and suppress 
dissent online. Wilson argues that the choices states make about internet control are contingent 
 
7 Rajat Kathuria et al., “The Anatomy of an Internet Blackout: Measuring the Economic Impact of Internet 
Shutdowns in India,” Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, April 2018, 
https://thinkasia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/8248/Anatomy_of_an_Internet_Blackout.pdf?sequence=1. Ben 
Wagner, “Understanding Internet Shutdowns: A Case Study from Pakistan,” International Journal of 
Communication 12(2018), 3917–3938, https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/8545/2465 
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on both the state’s internet infrastructure, as well as the tech-savviness of the regime seeking to 
control it.8 Wilson lays out a menu of options that states wishing to control their country’s 
internet can undertake, organized as three main approaches that each take aim at a different part 
of the internet: attacking individual “nodes”, controlling the network, and controlling the 
application layer. Governments with a very high level of technological capacity can attack 
‘nodes’ by utilizing viruses, spyware, and malware to track and control individual users. The 
United Arab Emirates, for example, passed legislation banning encryption of BlackBerry 
messages in 2011, allowing it to intercept personal messages between individuals and small 
businesses.9 States without access or ability to track individuals with sophisticated technology 
can ‘control the network’ instead. This approach entails a cruder set of tactics, including internet 
shutdowns, that rely on control of the physical infrastructures that enable connectivity (such as 
internet cables or cell phone towers) to police online behavior. This approach requires less 
sophistication, but it can also be more easily circumvented by citizens if a government does not 
make a shutdown far enough ‘upstream,’ or high enough on the hierarchy of physical 
infrastructure. Finally, controlling the application layer is another technically sophisticated 
method of control, also known as customized malware or ‘man-in-the-middle attacks.’ Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Iran have used this approach to gain access to personal email and social media 
accounts to screen anti-regime messages and gather intelligence.10 These kinds of surveillance 
and attacks require much more sophistication and a higher level of internet fluency than other 
approaches. For regimes with weaker IT capabilities, domain name system (DNS) blocking of 
 
8 Steven Lloyd Wilson, “How to control the Internet: Comparative political implications of the internet’s 
engineering,” First Monday, Volume 20, Number 2:2 (February 2015),  http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v20i2.5228 
9 Josh Halliday, “UAE to tighten Blackberry restrictions,” The Guardian, April 18, 2011, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/apr/18/uae-blackberry-emails-secure 
10 Wilson, “How to Control the Internet,” 2015. 
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specific websites or attacks on the internet infrastructure itself (i.e. a kill switch shutdown) are 
much more feasible.11 
While this theoretical framework is useful for conceptualizing the components of the 
internet that governments can target, a continuum of other actions and policy options exist for 
governments seeking to control access to or content on the internet. Some scholars have drawn a 
contrast between regime control of the internet and regime activism on the internet. While 
regime control of the internet uses the tools of online repression, the latter entails governments 
and their agents employing—rather than blocking—social media and online resources to spread 
pro-regime messaging and misinformation that undermines political opposition and civil 
society.12 Gunitsky builds on this work and develops a qualitative framework for how non-
democratic regimes in particular use social media. He argues that social media serves a four-fold 
purpose for autocratic governments seeking to pursue regime activism and boost their 
legitimacy: (1) counter-mobilization, (2) discourse framing, (3) preference divulgence, and (4) 
elite coordination. These tactics work especially well when governments can “crowd-out” civil 
society dissent and discourse that occurs online.13 For example, while China aggressively censors 
certain political content, such as calls for multiparty politics, not all online protest is taken down. 
“Protest within the bounds of the established political framework,” Gunitsky writes, “can be used 
by party moderates as ideological ammunition against communist hard-liners.”14 The internet has 
also allowed state interests to masquerade as non-state actors when they participate in public 
 
11 The domain name system (DNS) is the database that provides names for network resources and connects them to 
IP addresses. For more information on its development and role in internet infrastructure, see J. Klensin, “Role of 
the Domain Name System,” Network Working Group, Paper 3467. The Internet Society. 2003. 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3467. Also see: Wilson, 2015. 
12 Sheena Greitens, “Authoritarianism Online: What Can We Learn from the Internet in Non-Democracies?” 
Political Science & Politics, 2013. 
13 Seva Gunitsky, “Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability,” Perspectives 
on Politics 13, no. 1 (2015): 42–54, doi:10.1017/S1537592714003120.  
14 Gunitsky, “Corrupting the Cyber-Commons,” 2015. 
13 
 
discourse, using social media to join public discussion and shape discourse online.15 
Several scholars have established that that attacks on internet infrastructure (such as kill-
switch shutdowns) are more common among regimes with lower technological capacity. Rydzak 
argues that governments turn to increasingly advanced surveillance and censorship methods 
rather than simple internet shutdowns as they develop greater technological literacy. He cites 
video filtering and private armies of trolls that can be hired to report and remove undesirable 
content as tactics that are harder to track than simple shutdowns.16 Zittrain et al. study internet 
censorship and content filtering around geopolitical conflicts, and identify internet shutdowns as 
an extreme option from a menu of internet censorship techniques. Kathuria et al. identified 
online counter-speech as an alternative to internet shutdowns in India that required a higher level 
of capacity and digital literacy.17 Other scholars have also identified “throttling” as another tactic 
used by governments short of a full internet shutdown, by which a regime deliberately slows 
down internet connection speeds in public spaces and private residences.18 
2.2 Kill-Switch Shutdowns 
With so many options available to governments seeking to control their state’s internet, 
the question arises: what makes internet shutdowns different from any of these other choices? In 
his article on the subject, Wagner makes a case for considering internet shutdowns as a unique 
phenomenon, distinct from other forms of internet control and censorship. He argues that 
shutdowns are more closely related to human rights violations and threats to democracy than 
 
15 Jonathan Zittrain et al,, “The Shifting Landscape of Global Internet Censorship,” Berkman Klein Center Research 
Publication No. 2017-4; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 17-38, June 1, 2017, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2993485 
16 Jan Rydzak, “The Digital Dilemma in War and Peace,” 2018. 
17 Rajat Kathuria et al., “The Anatomy of an Internet Blackout,” 2018. 
18 Ramesh Subramanian, “The Growth of Global Internet Censorship and Circumvention: A Survey,” 
Communications of the International Information Management Association (CIIMA), Volume 11, Issue 2, 2011, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2032098. 
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other forms of internet control and censorship, as shutdowns not only take away communication 
and organization tools from protestors in times of crisis, but they also deprive surrounding 
society from accessing basic services in many cases.19 Rydzak agrees that shutdowns deserve 
separate consideration, and writes that “in societies with a rapidly growing digital user base, 
network shutdowns should be the most basic, crudest form of maintaining control over the wired 
populace […] they are palpable, their effects are immediate, and they are a direct response 
(rather than a preemptive measure) to perceived threats.”20  
Existing literature has also studied the physical and political infrastructure of the internet 
that makes it possible for governments to carry out internet shutdowns. Although we often think 
of the internet as a decentralized web of connections, the physical infrastructure of network 
cables is both highly centralized and inherently hierarchical. A comparative study of internet 
infrastructure and government shutdowns in Egypt, Syria, and Libya found that a more highly 
centralized internet infrastructure rendered it easier to control and more vulnerable to 
shutdowns.21 Egypt and Syria each had only one internet gateway, owned by a government 
monopoly, which made it simple for autocratic governments to order shutdowns. Libya, on the 
other hand, had infrastructure spread further apart geographically, which kept it outside 
government control and thus up and running during the country’s civil war.22 Other scholars 
have corroborated these findings, suggesting that internet shutoffs are easier to conduct in small 
countries, where there are fewer internet service providers (ISPs) to coordinate.23 
Some scholars have contended that the development and global spread of secure 
 
19 Ben Wagner, “Understanding Internet Shutdowns,” 2018. 
20 Jan Rydzak, “The Digital Dilemma in War and Peace,” 2018. 
21 Warigia Bowman and L. Jean Camp, “Protecting the Internet from Dictators: Technical and Policy Solutions to 
Ensure Online Freedoms,” The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 18(1), 2013, article 3, 
http://www.ljean.com/files/Dictators.pdf. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ramesh Subramanian, “The Growth of Global Internet Censorship and Circumvention,” 2011. 
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protocols (https://, rather than http://) for internet connection has pushed some states towards 
internet shutdowns over milder forms of internet censorship. Prior to the expansion of secure 
protocols, Zittrain et al. write, censors were able to block individual webpages on websites like 
Wikipedia, rather than blocking access to the entire site. That ability is limited on sites that use 
HTTPS, which leaves internet censors with an all-or-nothing choice: to allow or block 
everything on a website.24 
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
This section develops a theory of why governments choose to enact costly internet 
shutdowns in the face of societies’ dramatically higher mobilizational capacity since the spread 
of the internet worldwide. Given that this thesis is the first use of a novel dataset for a systematic 
analysis of the causes of internet shutdowns, I seek to test the effects of multiple independent 
variables on the likelihood of internet shutdowns. I begin with the factors that have been 
established as determinants by studies of earlier internet shutdowns, and then move into the 
factors I expect will have an effect on the likelihood of shutdowns based on my theory. I 
operationalize my variables in Section 4.  
3.1 The Logic of Internet Shutdowns 
 Internet kill-switch shutdowns are one of a variety of tools at a regime’s disposal as it 
seeks to achieve central policy goals. This paper assumes that states are rational actors whose 
policy goals revolve around maximizing their chances of political survival. This end goal is no 
different in democratic or autocratic regimes. In order to maintain power and achieve political 
survival, a government must successfully maintain security, grow the economy, and avoid mass 
unrest that threatens the legitimacy of the regime. Where transitions of power are less regular and 
 
24 Jonathan Zittrain et al., “The Shifting Landscape of Global Internet Censorship,” 2017. 
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less institutionalized (in autocracies), this last goal is even more important because mass unrest 
could lead to uprising or revolution. 
The rapid spread of ICT over the last decade has revolutionized the realm of state-society 
interaction. The Internet, mobile phones, and social media platforms have drastically raised the 
ability of societies to mobilize for both non-violent and violent collective action.25 While 
generally autocratic regimes are more concerned with non-violent mobilization and protest that 
could threaten legitimacy, both autocracies and democracies alike are challenged to 
countermobilize against violent collective action and threats to security that are organized and 
carried out with the help of the internet. 
The potential for digital communication platforms to increase dissent is widely 
documented in scholarly debates. In his book on the subject, James Fielder lays out the ways in 
which internet access can threaten authoritarian states through distance, decentralization, and 
interaction. He cites the ability to communicate cheaply and instantaneously over long distances 
as a huge boon to mobilization that puts autocrats on edge. He also describes how the 
decentralized flows of information that the internet enables are harder for states to control than 
earlier technology like television and radio. Thirdly, because of the interactive nature of the 
internet, users can be both producers and consumers of information and build trust through 
communities online.26 In the earlier days of the internet, this mainly took the form of message 
boards and forums, and has now been replaced with networks and groups on large social media 
platforms. Each of these characteristics of online communications have the ability to increase 
dissent in authoritarian states. Facing this threat to regime survival, governments may be 
 
25 Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations, Penguin Random House, 
2008. 
26 James Fielder, “The Internet and Dissent in Authoritarian States” in Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The 
Challenge to National Security, Taylor & Francis, April 19, 2016. 
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motivated to shut down the internet at times of high protest mobilization to maintain control. 
This theory, and many scholars of internet censorship and shutdowns, build on Christian 
Davenport’s study of repression and the ‘repression-dissent nexus:’ as a regime faces real or 
potential threats to its hold on power or the status quo, the likelihood of repression grows.27 
Scholars have identified the growth in internet and mobile penetration as a clear challenge to the 
status quo: unilateral state control over the flow of citizens’ information. Leberknight et al. argue 
that this development will compel regimes that have histories of repression to react against the 
rise of online communication and mobilization however possible.28 Existing cross-national 
studies seem to provide support for this theory, and find that broad ‘manipulation’ of internet 
access to be more prevalent in autocracies.29 Other scholars have further built on this theory and 
introduced other possible dynamics at play, like Kedzie’s concept of a ‘dictator’s dilemma,’ in 
which a regime may face social anger and increased mobilization regardless of its choice: to 
allow dissent on a free internet or by removing access to previously used forms of 
communication for a technologically-savvy populace.30 
There is a growing body of literature on how social media and other online 
communication may lead to increased intergroup distrust and violence. Many of the 
characteristics that make digital communications (particularly mobile internet access) a powerful 
tool for activism and nonviolent mobilization have also contributed to its use in collective mob 
 
27 Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 2007, pp.1-
23, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.143216 
28 Christopher S. Leberknight, Mung Chiang and Felix Ming Fai Wong, "A Taxonomy of Censors and Anti-Censors 
Part II: Anti-Censorship Technologies," International Journal of E-Politics (IJEP) 3 (2012): 4, accessed (April 26, 
2020), doi:10.4018/jep.2012100102 
29 Ronald Deibert et al., "Measuring Global Internet Filtering," in Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global 
Internet Filtering, MITP, 2008, pp.5-27.  
P.N. Howard, S.D. Agarwal, and M.M. Hussain, “When do states disconnect their digital networks?” 2011. 
30 Christopher Kedzie. Communication and Democracy: Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent Dictators. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997. https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD127.html. 
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violence in a number of countries. The speed and frequency of mobile communications, mass 
forwarding functions on mobile platforms, and the social structure of social media and peer-to-
peer messaging apps all make them potent tools for fostering violence and unrest.31 ICTs do not 
only have the potential to facilitate online rumor-based violence. Because they lower 
coordination costs, access to the internet has been shown to increase the risk of conflict in 
Africa.32 Access to mobile phone technology and internet services among previously 
unconnected populations has grown exponentially in the last decade, and with it, so has the risk 
of conflict outbreaks.  
Perhaps the most common reason cited by governments who have chosen to enact 
internet shutdowns are concerns for safety and security. Where localized shutdowns have 
become a common pre-emptive tool for preventing mobilization, governments often justify their 
action with the risk of violent collective action. Many officials have cited the spread of 
misinformation online as necessitating a shutdown before it leads to violence.33 Mukeredzi 
identifies violence prevention as a key factor in government decisions to carry out internet 
shutdowns in Africa, as does Rydzak in his study of internet shutdowns in Indian states.34 
Freyburd and Garbe find that election violence made internet shutdowns more likely to occur in 
their survey of sub-Saharan Africa, especially when ISP majority ownership rests in the hands of 
the state in authoritarian regimes.35  
 
31 Elizabeth Sutterlin, “Mob Violence, Mobile Phones: Private Messaging and the Future of Peacekeeping,” The 
Project on International Peace and Security, 2019. 
32 Jan Pierskalla and Florian Hollenbach, “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on 
Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Science Review 107:2 (2013), pp.207-224, 
doi:10.1017/S0003055413000075. 
33 Tonderayi Mukeredzi, “Uproar over Internet Shutdowns,” 2017. Jan Rydzak, “Of Blackouts and Bandhs: The 
Strategy and Structure of Disconnected Protest in India.” Stanford University Working Paper. February 7, 2019. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3330413 
34 Mukeredzi, “Uproar over Internet Shutdowns,” 2017. Jan Rydzak, “Of Blackouts and Bandhs,” 2019. 
35 Tina Freyburg and Lisa Garbe, “Blocking the Bottleneck: Internet Shutdowns and Ownership at Election Times in 
Sub-Saharan Africa,” International Journal of Communication 12, 2018, pp. 3896-3916. 
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The goals of maintaining security and suppressing dissent are often interrelated. More 
than one potential cause can often be identified in a government’s choice to carry out a 
shutdown. Scholars have noted the difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate efforts to 
maintain security and public safety and efforts to suppress dissent and mobilization. In his case 
study of shutdowns in Pakistan, Wagner puts it well: “Many of the shutdowns occur in the 
context of political rallies, elections, and public assemblies. Although there are clear security 
risks associated with such events, it remains an open question: What is being secured, and from 
whom?”36 
Regardless of regime intentions, internet shutdowns serve as a policy tool that 
governments select as a means of maintaining security and suppressing dissent in the face of a 
population with this new, much higher mobilizational capacity. But what leads a state to select 
kill-switch shutdowns, rather than other forms of online censorship, tactics of digital repression, 
or offline policies? I argue that a state’s choice to enact an internet shutdown is based on the 
perceived costs and benefits of the shutdown, as well as the state’s capacity to make use of other 
policy tools.  
Shutting down all internet services, even in a small geographic area, is incredibly 
disruptive and costly. There are economic costs—businesses and people that cannot carry out 
day to day transactions without access to mobile money or other digital financial services—as 
well as social and political costs. Domestic opposition politicians and digital rights watchdog 
NGOs can often come down hard on governments that enact repressive internet policy, and 
frequent shutdowns can erode public trust in government. However, if the perceived benefits of 
shutting down the internet are large enough (if the threat addressed with a shutdown represents a 
 
36 Wagner, 2018. 
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huge challenge to political survival), a regime may still select to enact a full shutdown. Part of 
that cost-benefit analysis is also a state’s capacity to make use of other policy tools to address the 
threats it faces (whether security threats or mass uprisings.) Not all states have the technological 
capacity to employ sophisticated online surveillance of citizens or rebel groups. And for many, 
the costs of deploying state security forces to respond to threats of violent collective action may 
be much higher than shutting down the internet for a few hours or days to prevent the spread of 
misinformation or the coordination of violent attacks. 
 The following section uses this theoretical framework to introduce possible determinants 
of internet shutdowns: factors that increase or decrease shutdown costs, increase or decrease 
shutdown benefits, or increase or decrease a state’s capacity to use other policy tools to respond 
to events that threaten a regime’s political survival. 
3.2 Determinants of Internet Shutdowns 
Having surveyed the state of academic literature to better understand what internet 
shutdowns are, how they are implemented, why governments enact them, I turn to factors 
identified in the extant literature that contribute to a state’s choice to shut down the internet. As 
mentioned earlier in this paper, given the relative newness of this phenomenon, the body of 
literature is still small, and few papers have delved into identifying the broad determinants of 
internet shutdowns.  
When considering internet shutdowns, this paper focuses specifically on kill-switch 
shutdowns, and does not consider other types of internet censorship and repression (i.e. throttling 
of internet speeds or specific platform-based DNS blocking) that are widely used by 
governments seeking to control the flow of online information. There are several reasons for this 
choice. First, as mentioned earlier, full internet network shutdowns represent one of the crudest 
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and most immediately felt choices about internet access that a government can make. As 
discussed in the literature review, other scholars have argued that kill-switch shutdowns deserve 
special treatment because of these qualitative differences. One other reason to consider these 
shutdowns uniquely from other forms of internet control is for reduced noise in the dependent 
variables. Many states have enacted blocks at some time or another for varying social, cultural, 
or religious reasons (i.e. bans on online gambling and pornography). The reasons behind 
blocking specific websites, mobile apps, or other internet activity can vary country to country, 
just as the platforms in question that are being blocked will vary widely. Because kill-switch 
shutdowns are both so extreme and so crude, the states that implement them likely have more 
uniform motivations and expectations for what those shutdowns will achieve. 
 Narrowed down to kill-switch shutdowns, this paper looks at the effects of several 
independent variables on two dependent variables. First, I look simply at whether a kill-switch 
shutdown occurred in a given country-year. Second, I look at the effects on the number of kill-
switch shutdowns that occurred in that country-year period. Looking at these as two different 
dependent variables is important, because while some countries only experience one shutdown 
around a large event in a year, there are some states where internet shutdowns have become a 
frequently used tool for controlling online speech. Reducing the variation in the data to a dummy 
variable obscures some of this, and so measuring both the presence of and the number of kill-
switch shutdowns will yield important and meaningful results.  
First, I examine the effects of regime type. Drawing on arguments from the literature, I 
expect that non-democracies and less democratic regimes will be more likely to implement 
internet shutdowns because they feel more threatened by the potential for greater mobilization 
and protest that internet services represent. The more autocratic a state is, the more likely it may 
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be to shut down the internet. However, as scholars have acknowledged variation within 
autocracies,37 I also examine the effects of civil liberties. Civil liberties and media freedoms 
make internet shutdowns more politically costly to governments, as media can serve as a vehicle 
for expressing public disapproval or backlash against internet shutdowns. If a regime expects 
such backlash from independent media that could threaten its political survival, it will be less 
likely to employ internet shutdowns. In countries where traditional mass media is owned or 
controlled by the state, television, newspapers, and radio may not accurately portray political 
developments or provide media coverage of protests or opposition movements. Where this is the 
case, social media and online communications play and even more pivotal role as a space for 
citizen journalism and a public sphere not controlled by state authorities.38 In that kind of 
environment, a regime might view online communications and social media as a threat to its 
information control. For this reason, I expect civil liberties to be negatively associated with 
internet shutdowns—the fewer civil liberties citizens and media have in a country, the more 
likely it is that a regime would shut down the internet. 
Several scholars have found that internet penetration and internet shutdowns to be 
positively related.39 In his groundbreaking cross-national analysis of internet shutdowns in non-
democracies, Rydzak found that internet penetration was consistently positively associated with 
network shutdowns (i.e., that the more citizens use the internet, the more likely it is to be shut off 
by non-democratic regimes.) Additionally, his study finds tertiary education levels to be 
consistently positively correlated with network shutdowns, supporting the ‘authoritarian anxiety’ 
 
37 Tina Freyburg and Lisa Garbe, “Blocking the Bottleneck,” 2018. 
38 Zeynep Tufecki, “New Media and the People-Powered Uprisings,” Technology Review, 2011. 
39 Conor Sanchez, “The Link Between More Internet Access and Frequent Internet Shutdowns,” Net Politics Blog, 
The Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/link-between-more-internet-access-
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hypothesis, in which non-democratic regimes fear an educated and connected population that is 
equipped to mobilize and drive collective action.40 However, the paper also identifies the 
existence of a ‘digital threshold,’ past which online repression tapers off. Scholars looking 
specifically at India have observed fewer shutdowns in Indian cities with better developed digital 
infrastructure and higher levels of digital activity.41 I expect this relationship to hold in my 
dataset of democracies as well as non-democracies—where there are few or no internet users, 
autocratic governments have no need to see the internet as a mobilizational threat. Additionally, 
if democracies are using internet shutdowns to address legitimate security concerns, their usage 
of internet shutdowns will also likely increase as the number of people using the internet rises, as 
a larger online population would likely lead to a larger number of threats to state security 
occurring online. As a larger portion of a country’s population gets online, both the costs and the 
benefits of enacting shutdowns increase, but building on Rydzak’s theory, I argue that the 
benefits rise more quickly than the costs. The higher the share of citizens who have access to the 
internet, the more shutdowns I expect to occur. 
While the level of internet penetration in a country has been found to be positively related 
to government propensity to conduct an internet shutdown up to a certain point, the size of a 
country’s digital economy would likely have a negative effect on the likelihood of shutdown. As 
more and more of a country’s economy is dependent on the internet and technological sectors, 
and as the internet continues to revolutionize business operations in every sector of the economy, 
the economic costs of an internet shutdown grow, making it more costly for governments to 
enact them. Several scholars have attempted to measure the economic impacts of internet 
shutdowns, but there is still no universal measurement of the size of a digital economy. The 
 
40 Rydzak, 2018. 
41 Kathuria et al., 2018. 
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digital economy is often measured by looking at the relative size of a country’s internet 
infrastructure.42 I expect to find that the more established a country’s internet infrastructure is 
(and thus the larger the digital share of its economy), the less likely its government will be to 
enact an internet shutdown, for concerns about the larger economic blowback of such a choice. 
As a country’s internet infrastructure grows, so too does the state’s technological capacity. In 
states with such well-established infrastructure, regimes will likely move away from crude 
internet shutdown tactics and towards more sophisticated methods of surveillance and content 
censorship, as the regime’s ability to enact these more precise policies effectively increases. 
Given that governments frequently cite security concerns and maintaining order around 
large events as reasons to implement shutdowns, I expect that the level of protest a country faces 
will play a role in whether it experiences a shutdown. As described in Section 3.1, high levels of 
protest, especially in an autocracy, can undermine the legitimacy of the government and threaten 
a regime’s political survival. Internet shutdowns then become more attractive policy tools to 
counter protest as the severity of the threat (and thus the benefits of addressing it) increase. If a 
state experiences high levels of protest, the regime may view online communications as a tool of 
mobilization enabling those protests. If it is easier to cut off the internet than it is to address the 
grievances being protested, the government will be likely to choose an internet shutdown. I 
expect that this effect will be stronger for violent protests, as in the face of protest violence, the 
justification of internet shutdowns for security purposes becomes even greater. Cutting off the 
internet is generally cheaper in the short run than counter-mobilizing police or military forces to 
disperse violent protesters. For these reasons, I expect violent protests to make states more likely 
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to shut down the internet. 
Many scholars have noted the relationship between large youth populations (youth 
bulges) and government repression.43 Not only are young people shown to be prone to mass 
mobilization and sensitive to socioeconomic grievances, but they are also the largest user base of 
online communications, and thus are both primed and prepared to use them to mobilize. Because 
of this greater mobilizational threat, a large youth population may increase the perceived benefits 
of enacting an internet shutdown, thus increasing the likelihood that a government will shut 
down the internet. This trend was especially visible during the Arab Spring, but it is unclear 
whether that relationship is broadly generalizable.44 However, it is still possible that youth 
populations have affected internet shutdowns cross-nationally in the last decade as population 
demographics and internet repression dynamics have continued to evolve. Per this theory, I 
expect that a larger youth population will increase the likelihood that a country experiences a 
shutdown. 
Internet shutdowns are often clustered around election times, especially in African states. 
Scholars and digital rights bloggers have theorized about a relationship between elections and 
internet shutdowns in electoral authoritarian regimes.45 Incumbents have political motivations for 
shutting off internet services (such as preventing members of the opposition from organizing 
protests or reporting election irregularities), but may also use security concerns about election 
violence or fears of fake election results being spread online as justification for the shutdown. 
Although crude, shutdowns serve their purpose in helping regimes effectively maintain their hold 
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on power in the face of electoral competition.46 Drawing on these theories, I expect that a regime 
will be more likely to enact an internet shutdown during an election year, as the potential 
benefits of an internet shutdown will be larger when a regime’s political survival is at stake in 
the lead up to an election. I also expect that this effect will be stronger for competitive elections: 
if opposition parties are barred from contesting results, the incumbent regime will have no need 
to shut off internet services in election years to prevent protests over the results. A credible threat 
to survival will make governments more likely to enact an internet shutdown. 
Scholarship on the relationship between conflict and internet shutdowns has had mixed 
results. Rydzak did not find support for the hypothesis that conflict can predict shutdowns—
neither when measured in battle-deaths or on a scale of conflict magnitude, and questions the 
prevailing assumption that regimes tend to disrupt internet services and digital communication in 
times of war or violence.47 This is inconsistent, however, with findings from Freyburg and Garbe 
who find that electoral violence plays an important role in the implementation of internet 
shutdowns in sub-Saharan Africa, though not a sufficient one on its own.48 Rydzak does include 
the caveat, however, that “trouble in the neighborhood” (conflict in the surrounding region) 
could lead a regime to wage a “preemptive assault on the digital rights of citizens.”49 Based on 
my theory, I argue that conflict will raise the perceived benefits of an internet shutdown as 
governments seek to maintain security. State forces could enact internet shutdowns to disrupt the 
online communications (and thus the ability to mobilize) of armed insurgent groups, or to 
prevent the spread of information that could harm regime legitimacy. I expect that a higher level 
of conflict will lead to an increased likelihood of internet shutdowns. 
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I include GDP per capita as a control, as several other scholars in this field have done 
prior.50 Poorer countries may not have the infrastructure to use more technologically 
sophisticated tactics than kill-switch shutdowns. I expect that wealthier states have the 
technological capacity to pursue other repressive tactics online, such as specific content filtering 
or surveillance. Because a higher GDP per capita raises the ability of a state to pursue other 
policy options, I expect an increase in GDP per capita to lead to a decrease in the likelihood of 
internet shutdowns.  
Given that the United Nations has passed resolutions condemning the use of internet 
shutdowns, even in crisis and conflict situations as violations of human rights law,51 and that 
several liberal Western democracies have declared their support for internet freedoms,52 it is 
clear that international norms against internet shutdowns have been set. While it is unclear what 
specific penalties states would incur from international legal institutions for violating these 
norms, regime leaders likely do recognize that they run the risk of losing the support of a security 
guarantor, development assistance, or simply good standing within international institutions as a 
result of implementing internet shutdowns and other digitally repressive tactics. Drawing on 
Levitsky and Way’s theory of linkage and leverage, I expect that regimes with fewer 
international linkages to countries that condemn shutdowns will be more likely to shut down the 
internet.53 Governments with more international linkages to states that are committed to freedom 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression 
and responses to conflict situations,” 2015. 
52 Hillary Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: choices and challenges in a networked world.” Remarks at George 
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of internet access will have more to lose in development aid, trade sanctions, and other 
international financial costs that raise the perceived costs of implementing shutdowns. 
Finally, this paper also seeks to test the path dependency hypothesis. Cursory 
examination of the data on which countries have enacted shutdowns from 2011-2019 shows that 
there are few countries that only implemented a shutdown once. Most countries have either never 
shut down internet access or have done so frequently in the last decade. This suggests that a 
potential path dependency may impact government choices of shutdowns. It seems likely that 
once a regime has shut down the internet once, it is much more likely to continue using that 
tactic in the future. After states have enacted a shutdown, the costs they face from subsequent 
shutdowns might fall while the benefits remain the same: citizens who had initially been 
unhappy about internet outages could be convinced of the necessity of more shutdowns for 
security, or further repressed to prevent them from protesting later shutdowns. I expect that 
shutdowns in the past increase the likelihood of shutdowns in subsequent years. 
4. Data and Methodology 
 I employ a mixed-methods approach to better understand which factors increase a 
government’s use of internet shutdowns and why. After explaining the unique strengths of this 
methodology, I describe the data I use for my dependent and independent variables in detail and 
explain the process through which I settled on the specific regression models in this paper. 
4.1 Mixed Methods Approach 
This thesis utilizes a mixed-methods analytical approach to first identify cross-national 
 
democratization, because they “raise the costs of autocratic abuses by increasing their international salience and the 
likelihood of external response, enhancing the power and prestige of opposition forces, and expanding the number of 
domestic actors with a  political, economic, or professional stake in adhering to international norms.” (379) For 
more information, see: Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Linkage versus Leverage. Rethinking the International 
Dimension of Regime Change." Comparative Politics 38, no. 4 (2006): 379-400, doi:10.2307/20434008. 
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factors that contribute to internet shutdowns, and then to process-trace the mechanisms through 
which those factors may be influencing government choices to enact internet shutdowns. By 
employing this nested research deign, this paper draws on the strengths of both large-N and 
small-n analyses for making causal inferences. Because there are several possible explanations 
for governments’ choices to enact internet shutdowns, I have chosen to begin with the larger, 
quantitative analysis to rule out explanations with little empirical support. I then move to the 
smaller, qualitative case study analysis for the explanatory variables that do find support, to 
examine the circumstances in which those variables are major determinants in a government’s 
decision to shut down the internet. 
I begin first with a cross-national analysis of internet shutdowns from 2011 to 2019 to 
identify potential factors that played a role in causing the shutdowns. The quantitative, large-N 
side of this methodology is important for several reasons. First, because so few quantitative 
studies of internet shutdowns have been conducted by scholars in the literature, there is a great 
deal of value in running regressions to identify statistical relationships that have yet to be 
documented or studied. The time period selected for this analysis is also important. The most 
recent large-N study of internet shutdowns uses data ending in 2011. As the demographics with 
internet access via both fixed-line and mobile connections have shifted drastically in the last 
decade, conducting a cross-national analysis of more recent data that more closely resembles 
today’s reality is of great importance. 
After analyzing relationships discovered and identified in the cross-national, quantitative 
analysis, I move to a case-study approach using the methodological framework put forward by 
Lieberman, in which “the small-n analysis should be used to answer the questions left open by 
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the large-N analysis.” 54 This small-n study will examine just how the factors shown to be 
statistically correlated actually lead to shutdowns of the internet. As both available data and 
statistical methods for analyzing that data are limited, the small-n segment of this nested research 
design, by making use of select cases to understand causality, will also inform future research 
questions to be answered using both small and large-N approaches, based on how well the theory 
suggested by the quantitative analysis seems to have predicted real country cases.55 
4.2 Dependent Variable  
 The unit of analysis for this paper is at the country-year level. There is some variation in 
the geographic scope of kill-switch shutdowns used by countries around the world; for example, 
in India, shutdowns are frequently executed at the local or regional levels of government, while 
in Ethiopia, shutdowns are more likely to come from the national government and impact a less 
localized population—in many cases, the entire country is included in the blackout. While there 
is certainly value in understanding why different countries enact shutdowns on different 
geographic and governmental levels, that question is outside the scope of this research. Based on 
previous work done by scholars in the literature, I do not suspect that the factors informing 
government’s motivations to carry out a shutdown at a local, regional, or national level would be 
any different. By analyzing data at the country-year level, I am able to evaluate kill-switch 
shutdowns in the same way and compare more easily across countries. I selected the 193 
countries in my dataset using the criteria of UN membership; non-internationally recognized 
states and observer states are not included. 
For the quantitative portion of this research, I make use of AccessNow’s database of 
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internet shutdowns from their Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP). The earliest 
reports of shutdowns included in their dataset are from 2005, with occasional missing years. 
Their data is complete beginning in 2011 and is the most up-to-date dataset of internet 
shutdowns; at the time I requested access to their master database, it included shutdowns through 
all of 2019. Some samples of their data are available online, but access to their complete records 
was granted for academic purposes and is available upon request. 
AccessNow’s STOP dataset captures several forms of government internet censorship: 
kill-switch (referred to in their data as ‘full network’) shutdowns, bandwidth throttling, and 
platform-based blockages. It does not capture more sophisticated forms of internet censorship, 
such as cyberattacks against targeted individuals or the use of groups of online trolls to report 
content en masse for takedown of sensitive media. Because this research is limited in scope to 
the determinants of kill-switch shutdowns, I excluded all entries from the STOP dataset that were 
instances of bandwidth throttling or platform blockages. However, a full network shutdown of 
either the internet, mobile network service, or both simultaneously are all considered. Including 
the shutdown of mobile services alone (without the shutdown of fixed-line internet) under the 
definition of full network shutdowns is important. In much of the developing world, people’s 
sole access to the internet is generally through cellular devices, because physical, fixed-line 
internet infrastructure is rare and prohibitively expensive. 
Having identified the cases of full network shutdowns in the STOP dataset from 2011 - 
2019, I used those entries to create two dependent variables for the cross-national portion of my 
analysis. First, I created a variable to count the number of kill-switch shutdowns that occurred in 
a given country-year, and then created a dummy variable to measure the presence of a kill-switch 
shutdown in a given country-year, where 1 indicates that a kill-switch shutdown occurred and a 0 
32 
 
means there was no shutdown. 
I also utilized the STOP dataset from AccessNow to test the path dependency argument. I 
created lagged variables to evaluate what impact past kill-switch shutdowns had on the 
likelihood a government would enact one again. For this, I also created two variables: first, one 
that measured whether a country had ever experienced a shutdown prior to that year, and second, 
one that measured whether a country had experienced a shutdown in the year directly preceding 
a given year. One important note regarding the construction of these variables is that 
AccessNow’s dataset did not include any entries from 2010. While it is possible that simply no 
shutdowns occurred that year, I did not feel that this was a safe assumption and did not want to 
erroneously code missing 2010 data as though there were no shutdowns if any had in reality 
occurred. For this reason, when I coded whether or not there had been a shutdown in the year 
immediately preceding a given country-year, I used Access Now’s 2009 data, essentially 
skipping 2010 and treating 2009 as the year before 2011 to address this data problem. 
4.3 Independent Variables  
I measure press freedoms using Freedom House’s civil liberties score. The Freedom 
House methodology is well-documented and widely utilized by scholars seeking to cross-
nationally examine press and political freedoms. The civil liberties score is a measure of 15 
questions grouped into four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.56 Countries are 
 
56 Internet shutdowns are one of the many indicators Freedom House uses to construct their Civil Liberties scores. If 
these values were strong predictors of internet shutdowns, this would undercut that effect; however, my analysis 
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scored from 1 to 7, with a higher score representing fewer press freedoms. I elected to use only 
the civil liberties score for each country-year in my dataset, rather than the full score, because I 
was less interested in capturing Freedom House’s measures of political rights, and felt that the 
questions asked to determine a country’s civil liberties score were more telling about the 
situation of informational and press freedoms in said country. As described in Section 3, I 
expected that this might have an effect different from simply the level of democracy or political 
freedom in a country. 
For measures of regime type, I utilize each country’s Polity scores from the Polity IV 
dataset. Countries are scored from -10 to 10, from least to most democratic. For countries in 
transition, I followed the standard described in the Polity user manual for converting countries 
with scores -66, -77, and -88 (representing foreign interruption, anarchy, and transition periods, 
respectively) to fit the conventional twenty-point scale for easier time series analysis.57 
To measure protest, I used open access cross-national dataset of protest from the Mass 
Mobilization Project, which aggregates the number of protests in a country-year period.58 The 
data captures every event in which more than 50 protestors publicly demonstrate against a 
government, and spans 162 countries from 1990 until 2018. Although not all 193 countries that I 
had initially hoped to examine are included in this data, this dataset was the most up-to-date, 
publicly available resource for analysis. The 31 countries not included in this data are primarily 
very small countries—most of the island nations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, for example. 
This dataset also disaggregates violent protests from the total number of protests that occurred in 
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Transitions, 1800-2016. Dataset Users’ Manual.” Center for Systemic Peace, p.17, 
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf.  
58 Clark, David and Regan, Patrick, "Mass Mobilization Protest Data," Harvard Dataverse V3, 2016, 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HTTWYL. 
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a country-year period, which allows me to specifically test for the effects of violent protest.  
I also draw my measure of a country’s online population from World Bank indicators. 
Specifically, I look at their indicator of individuals using the internet as a percentage of the 
population, sourced from the International Telecommunications Union database. Internet users 
are defined as someone who has used the internet from any location in the last three months, 
whether from a computer, mobile phone, personal desktop assistants (PDAs), games machine, 
digital TV, or other device.59 This data was available for all years through 2018. 
My measurement of the size of a country’s youth population also comes from World 
Bank data. More specifically, the population I was most interested in were those aged 15-19, 
because I expected that age group to be both the most technologically savvy and most inclined to 
protest. While the World Bank’s publicly available data did not have a direct statistic for the size 
of a country’s youth population aged 15-19, it does include the percentage of a population that is 
male and female, and the percentage of the male and female population that are aged 15-19.60 I 
created my own measure of the percentage of the total population aged 15-19 by doing the 
following math for each observation in my dataset: 
𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  [(% 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗  % 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 15 − 19 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  +
 (% 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗  % 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 15 − 19 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)] / 100  
My data on GDP per capita also came from the World Bank. I elected to use their 
measure of per capita GDP at purchasing power parity using current international dollars, from 
the last round conducted in 2011.61 
 
59 Despite being a clear metric of a country’s online population, there is reason to suspect that these indicators might 
be underestimates, especially in African states with high mobile phone penetration and use of mobile money but few 
fixed line internet connections. For more information on how the data was collected, see: World Bank, “World 
Development Indicators,” World Bank Open Data,  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?view=chart 
60 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” World Bank Open Data. 
61 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD 
35 
 
I gathered data on the time until a country’s next election from Princeton’s Database of 
Political Institutions, which includes a variable for the years until the country’s next national 
election, which includes both legislative and executive. Election years are coded as zeroes.62 To 
create a dummy variable out of this, I counted a country’s election years (zeroes in DPI’s 
dataset) as a 1 and all non-election country-years as 0. 
My measure of conflict came from UCDP/PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset. I did not 
distinguish between interstate and intrastate conflicts, but I used their measure of conflict 
intensity to measure the level of conflict occurring in a given country and year. I coded a zero for 
the absence of conflict, a 1 for low level conflict (25-999 battle deaths), and a 2 for intense 
conflict (1000 or more battle deaths), following the scale described in the UCDP/PRIO 
codebook.63 
My measure of competitive elections comes from V-Dem, the Varieties of Democracy 
dataset. I utilize their measure of national multiparty elections (v2elmulpar), an ordinal variable 
scaled from 0 to 4, where zero is the least competitive and 4 is the most competitive. The scores 
are based on respondents’ answers to the question: “Was this national election multiparty?”64 
Because not every year is a national election year, I used this data to create a lagged variable that 
signals whether or not the country’s most recent election was competitive. I also create a dummy 
variable for whether or not the country’s last election was competitive, and to do that, I condense 
the data so that a score greater than equal to 3 for a given country-year is converted to a 1 (a 
previous competitive election), and all values less than 3 are converted to a 0 (a previous non-
 
62 Carlos Scartascini, Cesi Cruz, and Phillip Keefer, “The Database of Political Institutions 2017 (DPI 2017),” The 
Inter-American Development Bank, https://publications.iadb.org/en/database-political-institutions-2017-dpi2017. 
63 Nils Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39(5), 2002, p.5. 
https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-191.pdf. 
64 Michael Coppedge et al., “V-Dem Codebook v9.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. 2019. 
36 
 
competitive election). V-Dem describes a score of 3 on this variable to mean that “elections are 
multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) 
from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent 
competition in a portion of the territory.”65 I chose this score as the cutoff point when 
constructing the dummy variable, as any country that could not meet these criteria for limited 
fairness did not have competitive enough elections to incite incumbents to use shutoffs to prevent 
mobilization or campaign organizing. 
My measure of aid dependence on the United States was calculated using GDP statistics 
from the World Bank at constant 2015 US dollars and using reported statistics from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID). I use aid from the United States specifically 
rather than an institutional or other unilateral donor for two reasons. First, by only considering 
one source country for assistance, it is easier to compare apples to apples when looking at 
recipient aid to GDP ratios. Secondly, because of the strong stance of the United States on 
commitment to internet freedoms abroad66 and the country’s relative power as a norm and 
agenda-setter in the international system, I expect that figures on aid received from the US would 
accurately show the relationship between Western foreign assistance and internet shutdowns.67 
As described in the theory section, measuring the size of the digital economy in dollars is 
nearly impossible. However, one proxy identified and recommended by the Organization for 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 Hillary Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs,” 2011. 
67 The Obama and Trump administrations have each taken very different approaches to American foreign assistance, 
both in the size of the budget and the issues prioritized. The Trump administration has overseen the U.S. retreat from 
leadership in international institutions and has generally harmed the image of the United States as a democracy 
promoter overseas. However, as my analysis only runs through 2019, it is somewhat too early to see the effects of 
changes made under the current administration since 2017. Many U.S. government programs that promote 
international internet freedom and condemn digital repression have remained in place across administrations. For 
more information on U.S. government internet freedom programs, see: U.S. Agency for Global Media, “USAGM 
launches independent internet freedom grantee,” U.S. Agency for Global Media, November 25, 2019, 
https://www.usagm.gov/2019/11/25/usagm-launches-independent-internet-freedom-grantee/. 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a country’s number of secure internet 
servers.68 This measure gives an estimate of the size and development of a country’s information 
and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. The size of a country’s ICT infrastructure 
is a good proxy for the relative importance of the digital sector in its economy. The World 
Bank’s open source data include a measure of secure internet servers in a country per 1 million 
people annually. Their measure uses a raw number of secure internet servers (defined as distinct, 
publicly trusted TLS/SSL certificates).69 The World Bank’s data comes from Netcraft’s Secure 
Server Survey, which “examines the use of encrypted transactions through extensive automated 
exploration, tallying the number of websites using HTTPS.”70 Where the certificate is valid for 
the hostname and has been issued from a publicly-trusted root, the geographic hosting location of 
the sites using that certificate are traced. The World Bank then divides that data by the mid-year 
population and multiplies it by one million to reach their measure. 
4.4 Methodology 
 This paper utilizes OLS regression to empirically test the relationships between my 
independent variables and the likelihood of a kill-switch shutdown. After importing all necessary 
data into Stata, I created lagged variables for variables in my dataset where there were not yet 
published values for 2019, but their values were unlikely to have changed in just a year. These 
variables were the Polity scores, online population, youth population, conflict, secure internet 
 
68 OECD, 2018. 
69 TLS/SSL certificates are essentially what makes a website secure and gives it a secure protocol (HTTPS rather 
than just HTTP.) They serve to encrypt the information that is sent over the internet between the user’s computer 
(the client) and the server hosting the websites that are visited, protecting sensitive information from potential theft 
or capture. These certificates are especially important for online transactions, in which sensitive financial 
information is communicated between servers and clients. For more information on how these certificates work, see 
Gruhn, Diana. https://www.entrustdatacard.com/blog/2019/march/ssl-certificates-101-why-do-i-need-an-ssl-tls-
certificate. 
70 Netcraft is a British cybersecurity company that has been tracking the global use of TLS/SSL protocols for market 
research since 1996. For more information on their survey, see their website: https://www.netcraft.com/internet-
data-mining/ssl-survey/.  
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servers per 1 million people, and GDP per capita. Prior to running any regressions, I ran a short 
test to check for high correlations between any of my independent variables that would have 
made including them all redundant. Through this process, I excluded some of the variables I had 
initially collected in my dataset and settled on twelve independent variables to test in my models. 
The collinearity tests for all variables can be found in Appendix A. Regime type (Polity scores) 
was dropped due to its high correlation with Freedom House scores. The general protest count 
variable was excluded as I expected violent protest to be more closely related to internet 
shutdowns, when governments have more incentive to shut down the internet to preserve 
security. I excluded the variable for the size of a country’s online population due to its high 
correlation with youth population. I elected to include youth population instead, as I was also 
still capturing a related measure to internet use through the secure servers per million people 
variable. I also dropped the dummy variable for whether or not a country was in an election year, 
instead keeping the variable for the number of years until the next election. Finally, I also 
excluded the non-dummy variable for electoral competitiveness, instead choosing to focus on 
whether a country’s last election met the cutoff described above to be considered competitive. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables I have selected.  
While running different variations of regressions to test how consistent the effects of my 
independent variables were, I noticed that my model was extremely sensitive to India. This 
makes sense, in that India has carried out the most internet shutdowns in the world, and generally 
enacts them at a local, or even hyper-local level—rather than enacting one national-level 
shutdown, Indian officials might instead enact multiple shutdowns at the municipal level on the 
same day. For this reason, I selected four regression models for analysis in this paper. I evaluate 
the effects of my independent variables on both the presence of shutdowns for the world 
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Table 2. Mean values and standard deviations for both independent and dependent variables, 
rounded to four decimal places. 
Variable Mean Value Standard Deviation 
Presence of kill-switch shutdown 0.0420 0.2007 
Number of kill-switch shutdowns 0.2343 3.4394 
Media freedom 3.3057 1.9030 
Prior shutdowns 0.1002 0.3003 
Shutdown in the previous year 0.0300 0.1705 
Violent protest 0.9717 2.5527 
Percentage of population aged 15-19 8.4501 2.2978 
Time to next election (years) 1.9780 1.4097 
Secure internet servers (per million people) 2550.317 11445.58 
Conflict 0.2065 0.4933 
Last election competitiveness 3.3402 1.0413 
GDP per capita (PPP) 17772.69 19043.47 
U.S. foreign aid to GDP ratio 1.2334 5.5974 
Year 2015 2.5827 
 
 (model 1) and without India (model 2), and on the number of kill-switch shutdowns for the 
world (model 3) and without India (model 4). The following section analyzes and discusses the 
results of these regressions. 
5. Quantitative Analysis    
The regressions shown in Table 3 show the coefficients, standard error, and level of 
significance for each of my independent variables. I have also included standardized coefficient 
plots to show visually the effects of my independent variables for each model. When looking at 
the signs for the coefficients on media freedom, it is important to note that since this analysis 
uses Freedom House scores, a higher number indicates a worse environment for free media. This 
variable did not have a statistically significant effect on the presence of shutdowns in either 
Model 1 or Model 2. However, worse civil liberties did have significant effects (at the 0.05 level) 
on the number of shutdowns that occurred in a country-year period in Models 3 and 4. Model 4 
has a mean number of shutdowns of 0.23, and an expected positive coefficient, suggesting that  
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Table 3. Four regression models for analysis. 
 
with all else equal, an increase in a country’s civil liberties score by one standard deviation 
would lead to a 2.8 percentage point increase in shutdown number in a given year. Model 3, 
however, has a much larger negative coefficient; the same increase in civil liberty score 
decreases the number of shutdowns in a given year by 18.7 percentage points. These different 
results demonstrate just how sensitive the sample is to India, especially for the effects on the 
number of shutdowns. In Model 3, the sheer number of shutdowns India, a democracy with a 
relatively free and open media environment, carries out each year drags down the coefficient. 
This effect of India on the coefficient for the civil liberties score is visually clear when we 
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compare the standardized coefficient plots for these models in Figures 1 and 2 on the next page. 
My models find a lot of support for the path dependency hypothesis. The data shows that 
governments that have used internet kill-switch shutdowns in the past frequently turn to them 
again as a tool for controlling the flow of information. The dummy for whether a country has 
ever experienced a kill-switch shutdown had a significant effect on the presence of shutdowns at 
the 0.01 level in Models 1 and 2, and had a significant effect on the number of shutdowns a 
country experienced at the 0.05 level in Model 4, where India was excluded. A prior shutdown 
increased the likelihood of another one by 7.4 points (a 176% change) in Model 1, and by 6.8 
points (a 134% change) in Model 2.  The Model 2 results tell us that for the prior shutdown 
variable, we can see that India is not completely driving the relationship. While prior shutdowns 
did not have a significant impact on the number of shutdowns when India was included (Model 
3), excluding India for Model 4 revealed a larger positive coefficient at a lower level of statistical 
confidence: all else equal, prior shutdowns increases the number of shutdowns per country-year 
by 12 percentage points. Shutdowns in the preceding year also had significant positive 
relationships with kill-switch shutdowns in three models. In Model 1, a shutdown in the 
preceding year made the presence of a shutdown 15.2 percentage points more likely at the 0.001 
confidence level. However, in Model 2 (with India excluded), shutdowns in the preceding year 
had no significant effect on shutdown presence. Differences between these two models can be 
compared visually in the standardized coefficient plots in Figures 3 and 4 on the following page. 
In Model 3, shutdowns in the preceding year led to an additional 5.5 internet shutdowns at the 
0.001 confidence level. Referring back to Table 1, earlier in this paper, it is clear that India has 
had shutdowns in more consecutive years than just about every country, so it follows that the 
effect on shutdown number would be so strong in Model 3. However, with India excluded in  
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Figure 1. The standardized coefficient plot showing the effects of my independent variables on the 
number of kill-switch shutdowns in all countries (Model 3). All variables except conflict and 
violent protest are lagged to the previous year. All independent variables have been standardized 
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 to determine their relative effects. The mean level 
of the number of KS shutdowns is 0.23 across country-years. The x-axis shows the relative increase 
in number of shutdowns. 
 
 
Figure 2. The standardized coefficient plots showing the effects of my independent variables on 
the number of kill-switch shutdowns in all countries except India (Model 4). All variables except 
conflict and violent protest are lagged to the previous year. All independent variables have been 
standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 to determine their relative effects. 
The mean level of the number of KS shutdowns is 0.23 across country-years. The x-axis shows the 
relative increase in number of shutdowns. 
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Model 4, we see a more modest figure for most other country-years: a shutdown in the preceding 
year led to a 25 percentage point increase in the number of shutdowns at the 0.01 confidence 
level. There are several reasons this could be the case, but one reason could be that after 
governments have enacted a shutdown in a preceding year and have developed the technological 
and political ability to do so, they learn to not only enact a shutdown again, but to enact a higher 
number of shutdowns at a more local level, so as to accrue the political benefits of a shutdown 
without the high economic costs of cutting off a whole country’s or region’s internet. This has 
been the case with India, which explains the huge coefficient in Model 3.  
One of the most interesting findings this data shows contradicts one of the hypotheses put 
forward earlier. Violent protest does not seem to be a strong predictor of internet shutdowns. Its 
coefficients in all four models are close to zero, and it is not statistically significant in any of 
them. This is quite surprising, given the expectation that states would use shutdowns to counter 
violent protest mobilization.  
The youth bulge hypothesis does not find much support either. The relationship between the 
size of the youth population and the presence of internet shutdowns (Models 1 and 2) is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In Model 1, an increase of 1 standard deviation in youth 
population increases the likelihood of a shutdown by 2.2 percentage points (a 52% increase), and 
in Model 2, without India, an increase of one standard deviation in youth population size 
increases shutdown likelihood by 2.1 points (or 57% more likely to occur.) In Models 3 and 4, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis and assert that youth population has any effects on a higher 
number of shutdowns that are not due to random chance. 
I also found no statistically significant effects from the time to a country’s next election on 
the presence or number of internet shutdowns. The coefficients were both small and not  
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Figure 3. The standardized coefficient plot showing the effects of my independent variables on the 
presence of kill-switch shutdowns in all countries (Model 1). All variables except conflict and 
violent protest are lagged to the previous year. All independent variables are standardized with a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 to determine their relative effects. The mean level of the 
presence of shutdowns is 0.042 (4.2%) across country-years. The x-axis shows the percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of a shutdown in a given year. Thus, all else being equal, conflict 
doubles the risk of shutdown (an increase of more than 0.04, or 4 percentage points). 
 
 
Figure 4. The standardized coefficient plot showing the effects of my independent variables on the 
presence of kill-switch shutdowns in all countries except India. All variables except conflict and 
violent protest are lagged to the previous year. All independent variables have been standardized 
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 to determine their relative effects. The mean level 
of the presence of shutdowns without India is 0.037 (3.7%) across country-years. The x-axis shows 
the percentage point increase in the likelihood of a KS shutdown in a given year.  
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significant, so it is quite possible that these effects are only due to chance. Similarly, there was 
no strong relationship between the number of secure internet servers per million people and the 
presence or number of internet shutdowns. The variable was not significant in any of the models, 
so any relationship could still be the result of chance. 
Conflict was one of the strongest predictors of shutdowns of all the variables in this analysis: 
it had significant effects at the 0.001 level in three of the four models. In Model 1, a one standard 
deviation increase in conflict intensity led to a 4.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood a 
shutdown would occur, all else equal. In Model 2, without India, a standard deviation increase in 
conflict intensity also led to a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a shutdown. When 
looking at the effects of conflict on the number of shutdowns enacted in a given country year, I 
find a very strong (but not significant) effect in Model 3 when India is included. But in Model 4, 
where India is excluded, the effect of conflict is both strong and highly significant at the 0.001 
confidence level. An increase in conflict intensity leads to an 11.9 percentage point increase in 
the number of shutdowns in Model 4.  
Figures 1 and 2 above demonstrate how when examining the effects on the number of 
shutdowns, India does drive some of the relationship between conflict and the number of internet 
shutdowns. Without India, the relationship is weaker but highly statistically significant. 
The competitiveness of a country’s elections did not have a significant effect on the 
likelihood of a shutdown occurring in either Model 1 or Model 2, but it did have an impact on 
the number of internet shutdowns in countries other than India in Model 4. At the 0.01 
confidence level, if a country’s last election was competitive, it would have a 6.2 percentage 
point increase in the number of shutdowns it enacted. Comparing across models also shows us 
that when India is removed from the analysis, the coefficient is calculated with much less error. 
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The negative sign on the coefficient in Model 3 for this variable is another sign of how sensitive 
the data is to India, given the sheer number of shutdowns it carries out each year. The other three 
models support the hypothesis that governments have more of an incentive to shut down the 
internet around competitive elections, as a tactic to maintain an incumbent’s grip on power. 
Where elections are less free and fair, and opposition parties are barred from contestation, 
incumbents have less reason to utilize shutdowns. 
A country’s GDP per capita had an incredibly weak and non-statistically significant 
relationship with shutdowns in all four models. However, the ratio of U.S. foreign aid a country 
receives to its GDP had statistically significant effects on the likelihood of shutdowns in Models 
1 and 2. In Model 1, a one standard deviation increase in foreign aid led to a decrease in the 
likelihood of shutdowns by 2 percentage points (a 47% decrease), which was significant at the 
0.01 confidence level. With India excluded, in Model 2, foreign aid increases led to a decrease in 
the likelihood of a shutdown by 1.8 percentage points (a 48% decrease), which was significant at 
the 0.05 confidence level. The ratio of U.S. foreign aid a country receives to its GDP had a 
significant negative effect on the likelihood of a kill-switch shutdown in Models 1 and 2, with 
and without India. This effect is slightly smaller but of less significance in Models 3 and 4, 
which measure the effects on the number of shutdowns enacted. This is one of this paper’s more 
encouraging findings—there seems to be some possibility to use aid as leverage to encourage 
regimes to maintain a free and functioning internet for their citizens. 
Finally, there is a statistically significant relationship between the year variable and both the 
presence and number of kill-switch shutdowns. In Models 1 and 2, an increase in the year leads 
to a 0.9 percentage point (24 %) and 1.1 (30%) percentage point increase in shutdown likelihood, 
respectively. In Model 1, this is at the 0.01 confidence level, and the 0.001 level in Model 2. In 
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Model 3, the effect on the number of internet shutdowns is not statistically significant, but when 
India is excluded in Model 4, each increase in the year variable leads to a 2 percentage point 
increase in the number of shutdowns that occur, at the 0.01 confidence level. These results 
support the time trend observed earlier in this paper: internet kill-switch shutdowns have become 
a much more popular tool for stifling the flow of online information in the last decade.   
Because I include the same number of variables in each model, I opted to use the simple 
r-squared value rather than the adjusted r-squared. The low r-squared values in each of my four 
models suggests that there is a great deal of variation in the data that they do not explain. There 
is still much work to be done to determine factors that explain patterns in government internet 
shutdowns, but finding a lack of evidence for many variables motivated by prevailing theory of 
internet shutdowns is an important contribution. While this analysis also relies on relatively short 
panel data (eight years,) the panel is not too short to draw meaningful conclusions from the data 
that Access Now has collected. As this analysis only relies on random effects and does not look 
at fixed effects within countries, these findings cannot predict year by year changes in shutdown 
likelihood within country cases. This work builds a general model that seeks to explain why 
countries use shutdowns (or do not use shutdowns), rather than attempting to answer why a 
country does or does not use a shutdown year by year. Better and more available data might 
make such a project possible in the future. 
Another limitation of this quantitative analysis stems from the necessity of using country-
level data. Shutdowns occur on a variety of geographic scales and can be executed by everything 
from the national to municipal level depending on the country in question. Examining all of these 
kill-switch shutdowns as if they were the same is less realistic but gives a larger sample size and 
sufficient variation of government-mandated shutdowns. Many of my independent variables are 
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also only captured at the country level, which makes looking at the geographic scope of a 
shutdown difficult. Many scholars have already opined about the problems with reducing 
complex phenomena into simple indicators like Freedom House scores, and even the ethical 
issues that emerge when scholars try transforming the realities of armed conflict into neat data 
points and clear-cut categories.71 By addressing the very real limitations of the data available for 
this thesis, this can hopefully serve as a starting point for further work into the causes of 
government internet censorship. 
6. Qualitative Analysis 
 Having identified broad trends in the data on internet shutdowns in the cross-national 
analysis above, this section of the paper aims to engage in process-tracing to evaluate the 
mechanisms behind three factors that appear to impact a regime’s choice to enact an internet 
shutdown. The three effects I focus on in this section are those of conflict, competitive elections, 
and violent protest.   ] I chose not to qualitatively examine the effects other two significant 
variables (shutdowns in prior years and the ratio of U.S. foreign assistance to GDP) for two 
reasons. First, while it is valuable to know that there is a path dependency for countries that 
implement internet shutdowns, that variable does not help to explain a country’s first shutdown; 
in other words, which factors led a country to start enacting shutdowns in the first place. 
Systematically understanding which countries stick to shutdowns while others steer away from 
them is important, but outside the scope of this thesis. I chose not to discuss the effects of aid 
dependence on the U.S. because of the difficulty of determining a cutoff point for distinguishing 
between countries that were dependent enough on aid to be ideal case studies. Is there a certain 
 
71 Valery Tishkov, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies and Data,” Journal of 
Peace Research 36, no, 5 (1999); 571-91. 
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dollar amount, or percentage of GDP, for U.S. assistance that will change the outcome of a 
shutdown, regardless of the sector to which that aid is allocated? Future iterations of this research 
could take a closer look at aid from different donors or donor types, as well as the sector to 
which aid is directed, to better isolate the effects of foreign aid dependence on shutdowns, but 
that question is currently outside of the scope of this thesis. 
6.1 Internet Shutdowns for Conflict Prevention: Bangladesh and Chad 
 To select cases for this qualitative analysis, I returned to Access Now’s dataset of 
shutdowns, and took note of all countries that experienced conflict that preceded a kill-switch 
shutdown. I did not take into account the severity of conflict when identifying the universe of 
cases here; any case with more than 25 battle deaths in a country-year period was included. This 
left me with 22 country-years. From that point, I ruled out cases where the conflict had preceded 
the shutdown by more than a year and was less likely to have had directly caused the shutdown. 
To isolate the potential confounding effects of other factors, I filtered out country-years that 
experienced violent protest to look strictly at the impact of conflict on the likelihood of 
shutdown. Two cases emerged from this process that highlight how armed conflict can motivate 
governments to carry out shutdowns: Bangladesh in 2016 and Chad in 2018. There are two 
causal pathways by which I would expect conflict to affect internet shutdowns. First, 
governments might use internet shutdowns to reduce the capacity of armed actors (insurgents or 
rebel groups) to mobilize against the state. Alternatively, a government might black out online 
communications if information about a conflict would affect regime legitimacy. 
 On August 2nd, 2016, the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission 
(BTRC) enacted a kill-switch internet shutdown in the business district of Dhaka for three and a 
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half hours as part of an “internet shutdown drill.”72 In addition to the temporary halt of internet 
services, mobile service providers also tested their abilities to stop voice calls during the drill. 
The month prior to the shutdown drill, on July 1st, 2016, armed gunmen had attacked a café in 
the area and killed 20 hostages before security forces were able to storm the building. Authorities 
had shut off internet to the café during the attack to prevent the perpetrators from communicating 
with the outside world, but the militants were still able to use SMS messages and phone calls to 
communicate. During and after the attack, images of the hostages were published by the Islamic 
State’s news agency.73 After the shutdown in in Dhaka, the chairman of the BTRC announced 
publicly that this was the first in a series of planned, short-term internet shutdown drills.74 The 
drill was accompanied by the blockage of thirty-five news websites, some of which publish 
articles critical of the government in power.75 
 The Dhaka shutdown was not the first in Bangladesh. The country experienced a 75-
minute full shutdown in 2015, which was followed by the blocking of several websites and social 
media platforms for four weeks.76 But in the 2016 internet shutdown drills, the primary motivator 
seemed to be the ability of state security forces to effectively respond to terrorism threats; the 
BTRC tested whether state forces could still communicate while the internet was down in 
Dhaka’s business district.77 In the case of similar terrorist threats in the future, the BTRC hoped 
to use internet shutdowns to limit terrorists’ ability to communicate and gain attention from other 
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extremists online. The blockage of opposition news websites, while not an instance of a kill-
switch shutdown, provides interesting insight to how states can use different repressive internet 
tactics in tandem to achieve policy goals. The censorship of certain online news sources may 
have been an attempt to prevent criticism of how the ruling party had handled the terrorist attack 
the month before, or to prevent discontent about internet shutdown drills that could lead to 
protest or other questions of regime legitimacy. Through the Bangladesh case, we can see the 
type of events—instances of terrorism in a country where political violence is not uncommon—
that motivate governments to consider internet shutdowns as a tool for controlling the flow of 
information in crisis situations. The Bangladesh case is also more clear-cut than many instances 
of internet kill-switch shutdowns. Whereas some governments will often chalk up an intentional 
shutdown to technical difficulties, the government openly acknowledged the shutdown. The fact 
that it was a test demonstrates that the action was premeditated, and that the government was 
considering the utility of internet shutdowns as a future policy tool. 
 Next, I turn to Chad’s 2018 internet kill-switch for another instance of a shutdown 
motivated by ongoing violent conflict. Chad faces a precarious security situation, with state 
forces spread thin fighting rebel groups, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and preventing 
further ethnic violence between tribes that have fought intermittently since the country gained 
independence.78 The Chadian government is further stretched by the hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from neighboring Sudan and the Central African Republic who are vulnerable to 
violence, and in many cases, on the brink of starvation.79 The country’s executive branch is 
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dominated by the Zaghawa ethnic group from the northeast, including the president, Idriss Deby, 
who has been in power since 1990.80 The president’s party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement 
(MPS), also exerts significant influence in Chad’s legislature. 
In March 2018, the Chadian government conducted a kill-switch shutdown after reforms 
were announced that would allow Deby to stay in power until 2033.81 The political opposition 
had boycotted the conference where the constitutional reforms were announced. While access to 
the internet was restored shortly thereafter, social media platforms like WhatsApp, Twitter, 
Facebook, and Viber remained inaccessible for over a year. While there may have been reasons 
for the shutdown to prevent opposition protest, the director of Internet Without Borders, an 
organization that ran a campaign for freedom of information in Chad, claimed that the shutdown 
was to prevent the spread of video footage of conflict among the Zaghawa tribe on WhatsApp 
and other social media platforms.82 While I was unable to locate the original video footage that 
many of the sources coming from Chad described, Francophone bloggers claimed that it 
contained footage of Salay Deby, the president’s younger brother, insulting other prominent 
members of the Zaghawa group while praising the president and his MPS party.83 Sources also 
claimed that rebel factions were particularly active online at this time, which may have 
contributed to the security concerns that Chad’s government cited as the reason for the internet 
shutdown. 
The political and economic control exerted by the Zaghawa and other northern ethnic 
groups has frustrated many in the southern part of the country that often explodes in instances of 
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conflict or violent demonstrations.84 Given Chad’s ongoing fights with rebel groups and history 
of coup attempts,85 Deby and his government would thus have strong motivation to cut the 
internet and limit the spread of the leaked WhatsApp footage if it gave the impression of 
infighting within the ruling ethnic group. Such infighting could be quickly seized by opposition 
politicians, rebels planning a time to strike a blow to government forces, or leaders of 
underrepresented ethnic groups hoping to accumulate more political power by driving a wedge 
between leaders at a critical moment. Available evidence suggests that the Chadian government 
used a kill-switch shutdown to prevent the spread of information that would undermine the 
legitimacy of his regime in a conflict-prone environment, the second causal pathway through 
which conflict would affect internet shutdowns.  
Very few people in Chad have internet access to begin with—according to the World 
Bank, only about 6.5% of Chadians use the internet.86 But this case reinforces what other 
scholars of online repression have suggested: that governments recognize the Internet as a 
powerful, and potentially dangerous tool for mobilization even at low levels of penetration and 
usage.87 Because of the nature of intrastate conflict and political risks (namely coup threats) in 
Chad, Deby and his associates did not need to fear that the whole country would see content 
online and revolt in an Arab Spring-style democratizing push. Even just a few political elites 
among the opposition or from marginalized ethnic groups seeing cracks in the coalition Deby has 
built over the last three decades would represent a huge political risk and an opening for rebel 
mobilization or a sudden coup. 
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Another interesting facet of the Chad case, however, is that it contradicts some 
expectations that emerge from the cross-national analysis above. As the presence of western 
foreign assistance seems to decrease the likelihood of an internet shutdown generally, it is 
curious that the Chadian government still utilizes kill-switch shutdowns and social media 
blocking as tools of digital repression, given its close security partnerships with France and the 
United States. While the relationship identified earlier provides us with reasons for optimism—
perhaps aid can be used as leverage to encourage regimes to abandon repressive internet 
tactics—Chad’s kill-switch shutdown and ensuing year-long social media censorship raises the 
question of whether the opposite is more likely to occur. Perhaps the imminent security threat 
Chad faces outweighs the influence of its Western security partners. Or perhaps because the 
United States needs its support to conduct counterterrorism operations, it is willing to turn a 
blind eye to the repression Deby and the rest of Chad’s ruling regime carry out online, even 
when it violates democratic principles and international law. 
6.2 The Null Effects of Protest on Internet Shutdowns: China and Tajikistan 
 To study the effects—or lack thereof—of violent protest on the likelihood of internet 
shutdowns more closely, I first excluded all country-years except for those in which there was 
(1) no shutdown, (2) at least one violent protest, and (3) no other violent conflict that could be a 
confounding factor or partial reason for the shutdown. This returned a large number of cases, as 
protests, even violent ones, frequently occur in stable democracies that do not respond with 
internet shutdowns. To further narrow my search for representative cases that could contribute to 
the theory about how protests fail to lead governments to internet shutdowns, I further excluded 
all country-year periods that had not had (4) a shutdown in the past. Not only did this help to 
isolate cases, but allowed me to gain further insight theoretically—why would a government that 
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had demonstrated itself willing to carry out internet shutdowns in the past not do so in 
subsequent years in the face of violent protests? Interestingly, the country-year periods that met 
all four of these criteria fit two ‘archetypes:’ states with both high and low technological literacy. 
To process-trace the pathway from violent protest to no shutdown, I selected one of each 
archetype for qualitative analysis: a state with high technological capacity, China, and Tajikistan, 
a state with low technological capacity. 
China had enacted a kill-switch shutdown in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, in 
July 2009 in response to massive protests that devolved into ethnic riots, killing 193 people and 
injuring thousands more.88 After Uighur citizens of the province clashed with riot police while 
protesting judicial discrimination, some rampaged and killed Han Chinese residents over several 
days. In turn, groups of Han vigilantes later attacked Uighurs in retribution.89 The relative sizes 
of the losses on each side are disputed. The protests had been organized via text messages, phone 
calls, and the internet, according to Chinese authorities, who kept internet services out for ten 
months to prevent violence and protest from resurging.90 However, since 2011, China has not 
carried out a single kill-switch shutdown, despite reports of multiple violent protests in each year 
from 2011 to 2017, many of which have taken place in Xinjiang province.91  
One does not have to look far for reasons why crude kill-switch shutdowns are no longer 
the digital repression tool of choice for the Chinese Communist Party. China is a state with high 
technological capacity, and it has been able to develop sophisticated practices for censorship and 
control of online content. Much has been written about “the great firewall of China,” the 
 
88 Chris Hogg, “China restores Xinjiang internet,” BBC News Shanghai. May 14, 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8682145.stm 
89 Edward Wong, “Rumbles on the Rim of China’s Empire,” The New York Times Week in Review, July 12, 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12wong.html 
90 Chris Hogg, “China restores Xinjiang internet,” 2010. 
91 Olukotun and Micek, 2020. Clark, David and Regan, Patrick, "Mass Mobilization Protest Data,"2016. 
56 
 
draconian censorship laws that keep controversial content out by replacing many of the 
communication platforms owned by Western companies and used internationally with analogous 
Chinese ones: Weibo for Twitter, Baidu for Google, and many others.92 Since Xi Jinping took 
office as president in 2012, China’s government has not only invested in more sophisticated tools 
for internet filtering, but it has also employed up to two million people to monitor the Chinese 
internet and take down any content that challenges the Communist Party.93  
Within Xinjiang province specifically, there is evidence of heavy censorship and 
surveillance online. In 2011 China introduced WeChat, which quickly became a popular and 
essential tool for communication across China, including in Xinjiang where a version in the local 
language was offered. One Uighur scholar stressed the brief moment of freedom that many felt 
as they became connected to others and could share their beliefs online like never before.94 This 
included radical Islamist content, and although it constituted a small minority of content shared 
on WeChat, it led to swift crackdowns on the Uighur population. Starting around 2014, mentions 
of Islam or religion on the app could be flags to authorities for surveillance or arrest, as several 
bombings throughout China were attributed to Uighur militants.95 In 2016, the regional 
government of Xinjiang passed stricter controls on online speech, including heavy fines for news 
websites and platforms that failed to remove false information, or content that mentioned ethnic 
conflict, terrorism, or violent extremism.96 At the same time, 160,000 cameras were installed in 
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the regional capital Urumqi, as both online and physical censorship developed in tandem.97 
Scholars have contended that the huge increases in the size and sophistication of China’s 
tactics to uphold the ‘great firewall’ have likely made crude internet kill-switch shutdowns 
obsolete.98 In a state that has the knowledge and the financial resources to censor critics of the 
regime online without bearing the massive economic and social costs of blanket shutdowns, it is 
highly unlikely that the state would see a need to continue the kind of shutdown that occurred in 
2009 in Xinjiang. One alternate explanation could be that other than isolated terrorist attacks, 
China has not seen a period of intense ethnic conflict in Urumqi or Xinjiang as intense as the 
2009 riots since that time. While the exact reasons that mass violence has not erupted again are 
difficult to determine, it is quite possible that the extreme levels of both online and offline 
repression and surveillance have prevented any such mobilization of discontented Uighurs. 
While we lack the information to answer whether or not China would enact another full network 
shutdown again if faced with 2009 levels of extreme interethnic violence, this case highlights an 
interesting point: that governments willing and able to go to extremes of digital censorship and 
surveillance may be able to circumvent the situation in which a kill-switch shutdown would be 
deemed necessary. 
Tajikistan, lacks the kind of financial and technological resources that China has been 
able to utilize instead of kill-switch shutdowns over the last decade. In addition to being one of 
the world’s poorest states, Tajikistan has extremely low levels of internet penetration and 
technical literacy. This is partially a function of geography: as a landlocked country, Tajikistan 
has no direct access to the undersea cables that connect states and continents in a truly global 
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internet network, and any extension of the nearest undersea cables (located in Pakistan) over land 
would have to pass through conflict-torn Afghanistan, which would leave a Tajik internet 
connection vulnerable to frequent physical line cuts and other attacks.99 Despite low levels of 
internet access in the country, Tajikistan’s government still enacted a kill-switch shutdown in 
2006, timed around the 2006 presidential election in which incumbent Emomali Rahmonov won 
a third term.100 The government acknowledged the shutdown and attempted to justify it in the 
name of quelling unrest and preserving order, but given the timing, attempts to restrict opposition 
coordination appears to be a more likely cause.101 Tajikistan also did not fit the theoretical mold 
of a competitive election—Rahmonov won his third term with 75% of the vote, and Tajikistan’s 
elections are far from free or fair. However, when faced with violent protests in 2012 and then 
again in 2014, the Tajik government did not carry out another kill-switch shutdown. In 
examining the Tajik case, the same question arises: why would a state that had used kill-switch 
internet shutdowns in the past not utilize the same tool of repression in the face of violent 
protest? Tajikistan does not have the resources, or even a large enough online population, to use 
tactics as sophisticated as China’s.  
Tajikistan, however, can still teach us something interesting about internet shutdowns and 
other internet censorship tactics. Reports from 2014 indicate that while the Tajik authorities did 
not institute a kill-switch shutdown as they had in 2006, they responded to the threat of violent 
protests organized by “Group 24” with other repressive internet tactics, namely, blocking 
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specific websites and online platforms regularly around times of major political events.102 Oleg 
Salimov describes how opposition websites, online news sources, and social media were 
repeatedly blocked “before Tajikistan’s parliamentary elections in the winter of 2010, during 
Tajikistan’s military operation in the Autonomous region of Badakhshan in the summer of 2012, 
after the President’s son Rustam Emomali’s wedding in the spring of 2013, before the 
presidential election in the fall of 2013, and during political protests in Ukraine in the winter of 
2014.”103 The blocking of social media platforms does not appear to have an anti-Western bias, 
as Tajik authorities also frequently block the Russian social media platform Vkontakte as well as 
Facebook and YouTube.104 
In response to rumors of planned protest activity in the capital city Dushanbe on October 
10, 2014, authorities in Tajikistan blocked the websites of local and international news outlets, 
opposition parties, as well as Facebook and Vkontakte on October 4th and did not allow access to 
the blocked sites again until October 11th. While the state telecommunications services denied 
responsibility for the blockages, the head of one of Tajikistan’s ISPs, Asomiddin Atoev, claimed 
that the action was meant to prevent organized large-scale protests in Dushanbe.105 
The shift in the internet censorship approach used by the government of Tajikistan 
between 2006 and 2014 reveals an important finding: a state does not have to be highly 
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technologically literate to move away from kill-switch shutdowns to other forms of internet 
control. Protest movements did not lead to the use of kill-switch shutdowns in Tajikistan, but 
they did lead to platform-based shutdowns and DNS blocking that the state enacted to try to 
hamper protest. This insight is critical, because it demonstrates that states do not need the same 
amount of wealth and technical sophistication as Xi Jinping’s Communist Party to move past 
crude and extreme kill-switch shutdowns. If other forms of internet censorship are within the 
technical reach of a country as economically and technologically poor as Tajikistan, they are 
within the grasp of any regime looking to limit the spread of information online through means 
other than a full network shutdown. 
These two cases demonstrating the null effects of violent protest on kill-switch 
shutdowns contribute some very interesting findings to our understanding of internet censorship. 
While violent protests do not seem to have led to many full network internet shutdowns in the 
last decade, China and Tajikistan illustrate that states with any level of technological literacy can 
easily use other digitally repressive tactics to respond to or pre-empt protest and dissent. The 
path dependency demonstrated previously in this paper still holds water, but these cases help us 
to better understand in what situations governments will turn to kill-switch shutdowns time and 
time again. For now, it seems like many regimes recognize the limited utility of full shutdowns 
when faced with violent protest but not ongoing armed conflict. 
6.3 Competitive Elections and Internet Shutdowns: Sierra Leone 2018 
 Restricting analysis to cases where a kill-switch shutdown occurred in the presence of a 
competitive election, but without conflict or protest, filters out all cases but one: the internet 
shutdown that occurred on the night of Sierra Leone’s 2018 runoff for the general election. The 
election’s first round was held on March 7, 2018 and pitted the Sierra Leone People’s Party’s 
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(SLPP) Maada Bio against the All People’s Congress’s (APC) Samura Kamara. While the APC 
had been the ruling party up until 2018 (and the SLPP its main opposition), Kamara was not the 
incumbent—the former president Ernest Bai Koroma had served his two-term limit and stepped 
down. The APC maintained its parliamentary majority, taking 63 out of 132 seats, but no 
presidential candidate received the 55% of votes necessary for a clear victory in the initial 
election.106 Bio and Kamara were separated by less than 15,000 votes and a runoff was scheduled 
for March 27, 2018.107 The initial general election had already been fraught with accusations of 
ballot-tampering,108 and the runoff was postponed to March 31 after further allegations of fraud 
and police harassment.109  
Shortly after polling stations closed on March 31st (at around 10:15 PM), internet and 
mobile telephone access was restricted throughout Sierra Leone.110 One internet censorship 
watchdog group corroborated reports of the shutdown, citing noticeable decreases in Google 
traffic statistics from Sierra Leone on Saturday, March 31.111 The shutdown lasted nine hours, 
and services were reported to be restored around 7:30 in the morning on Sunday.112 An election 
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monitoring group, Sierra Leone Decides, reported on Twitter after service returned that the 
shutdown had been to prevent the national electoral commission from sharing results with party 
affiliates as votes were counted.113 
 When early reports of the shutdown were published the following morning, the 
government had not yet made an official statement as to the reason for the shutdown, leaving 
reporters to theorize about the cause and look to past examples of internet shutdowns timed 
around elections in African states, namely in the Republic of Congo, Gambia, Chad, and 
Uganda.114 Following the shutdown and the electoral victory of the SLPP’s Maada Bio, the APC 
accused Sierra Leone’s electoral commission of malpractice and election fraud due to the 
communications blackout, and the inability of electoral officials to communicate via internet or 
mobile services as runoff votes were being counted.115  
The following day, April 2nd, 2018, Sierra Leone’s national telecommunications 
regulatory body released a statement denying responsibility for the shutdown and emphasizing 
that the Sierra Leone Cable Company (SALCAB) is the entity that manages the country’s 
physical internet cable infrastructure.116 In its statement, the state telecommunications agency 
reported that SALCAB had traced the blackout to a problem with a physical submarine cable in 
Mauritania.117 However, work from OONI found that while neighboring states that relied on the 
same submarine cables experienced outages of the internet on March 30th, 2018, the shutdowns 
on the night of March 31st were inconsistent and likely not caused by damage to physical 
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undersea cables.118 With other causes ruled out by the work of NGOs like OONI, and with 
repeated electoral irregularities reported by Sierra Leonians in 2018, there is reason to believe 
that the shutdown was premeditated. 
As the government of Sierra Leone at no point took responsibility for the shutdown, it is 
difficult to assert without doubt that the internet shutdown was the result of a government order. 
Unlike other African regimes that have enacted internet shutdowns around the time of elections, 
Sierra Leone’s government did not claim that it enacted the shutdown for reasons of national 
security. Neither presidential candidate was an incumbent in 2018, so an internet shutdown was 
not ordered by the incumbent president as a means of manipulating results to extend his term. 
The fact that the SLPP opposition candidate narrowly won the runoff vote is also curious—a 
situation in which the APC shut down the internet to manipulate results in their party’s favor 
would be more clear cut.  
While the country has come a long way since the end of its infamously bloody civil war 
in 2002, Sierra Leone’s elections are still ordinarily marred by low-level violence and ethno-
regional polarization. The APC has long drawn support from ethnic groups in the north and west, 
while the SLPP is popular among smaller groups in the south and east parts of the country. In 
2007, then-incumbent Ahmad Kabbah threatened to call off the election due to violence, and 
candidates from both the APC and the SLPP accused the other of voter intimidation.119  
The reasons why the government of Sierra Leone would carry out an internet shutdown, 
are unclear, but the reports suggest one potential compelling cause. With widespread reports of 
electoral regularities and a history of electoral violence between ethnic groups, the time between 
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the closing of polls and the announcement of the official result could have held significant 
danger. If one takes the word of the Sierra Leone Decides election monitoring group’s word over 
that of the country’s national telecommunications commission, then it is possible to see why the 
government would implement a shutdown to prevent the sharing of early results online as votes 
were counted. The credible threat of riots could motivate the incumbent government to shut off 
the internet during the vote count even if the APC was not altering ballots in their candidate’s 
favor. Riots and other widespread violence occurred during Sierra Leone’s 2007 election, and the 
greater access to ICTs in 2018 would allow rumors of early election results that could incite 
violence to spread much more quickly.120 If their desire to protect citizens from possible violence 
outweighed their desire to see a fellow member of the APC party assume the presidency, 
President Komora’s outgoing government may have chosen to shut down the internet without 
infringing on the NEC’s ballot-counting. 
Further, the case of Sierra Leone clarifies an important distinction that the quantitative 
data had obscured. Process tracing helps to more accurately pinpoint the timing and methods a 
government uses to enact a shutdown. The timing of this shutdown to occur while votes were 
being counted rather than cast in a close runoff election is a quite different strategy than the 
hypothesis I had initially expected to see: that states would use shutdowns before elections to 
limit the ability of opposition parties to mobilize. The fact that in this case, the blackout of 
internet only occurred after polls had closed, suggests that a different relationship between kill-
switch shutdowns and competitive elections: that shutdowns may serve as a tool for obscuring 
electoral interference as well as countering mobilization and silencing dissent.  
 
120 While the percentage of Sierra Leone’s population that uses the internet regularly still hovers around 10%, 
mobile phone subscriptions have skyrocketed from 12 per 100 people in 2007 to 88 per 100 people in 2018. (World 
Bank) 
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7. Conclusion 
 More and more governments have begun using kill-switch shutdowns to address 
misinformation, conflict, and unrest in the last decade. These shutdowns have debilitating social 
and economic costs and threaten human rights around the world. As internet kill-switch 
shutdowns become a popular policy tool in autocracies and democracies alike, it is crucial to 
better understand the factors that influence governments in their decision to shut down the 
internet in times of crisis. This thesis has presented several findings of interest: first, it confirms 
that there is a time trend at play in the spread of internet kill-switch shutdowns globally, and that 
a regime that uses internet shutdowns once is much more likely to do so again. Second, it 
suggests that while violent protest does not serve as a strong predictor of whether a government 
will shut down the internet, armed conflict makes intentional internet shutdowns much more 
likely. Competitive national elections also emerge as a likely cause for shutdowns, as incumbents 
have motivations to prevent oversight of election counting if opposition parties are allowed to 
contest. Finally, foreign assistance provided by the United States is associated with fewer 
internet shutdowns—while it is currently unclear if foreign aid is a direct cause of regimes’ 
aversion to shutdowns, it suggests that the international community can play a role in setting 
norms against internet shutdowns and using international finance to encourage a more 
democratic and open internet internationally. 
 The implications of these findings are relevant for policymakers as well as academics. 
The potential to reduce internet shutdowns through linkage and leverage provides us with a cause 
for optimism. While this study did not separate out the effects of humanitarian aid from 
democratization assistance, funding that targets building democratic institutions and protecting 
media freedoms may help to mitigate the use of costly and extreme internet control tactics. 
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 There are several steps that future researchers looking to understand the phenomenon of 
kill-switch shutdowns could take to build on this work. First, as mentioned in the methodology 
section, the inability to differentiate between shutdowns at different geographic scales is a major 
limitation of this paper, and future research should look to explore the potential different causes 
of shutdowns at varying local, regional, and national levels. Developing data tools to accurately 
measure the costs of an internet shutdown would also allow for a better understanding of the 
cost-benefit analysis that regimes are faced with when they consider whether or not to shut off 
the internet. Currently, scholars have an idea of what factors to consider in calculations in 
shutdown cost,121 but disputes over how to define and measure a state’s “digital economy” make 
it difficult to develop precise measures. As the internet now permeates almost all financial 
transactions and businesses, and not just those in the information technology sectors, accurately 
measuring the size of online economies around the world becomes both more complicated and 
more important. Another potential avenue for future research would be analyzing the extent of 
cross-border spread of internet shutdowns over time. Some scholars have argued that events 
outside a state’s borders could influence its domestic internet censorship policies, whether those 
events are the existence of regional conflicts, or internet censorship practices by neighboring 
states that set an example for their effective use.122 Others have noted the spread of internet 
shutdowns as a tactic for countermobilizing against conflict within cases over time.123 Scholars 
looking to analyze kill-switch shutdowns in the future should consider the potential for cross-
border spread of particular internet shutdown measures. 
 
121 Darrell M. West, “Internet shutdowns cost countries $2.4 billion last year,” Brookings Center for Technology 
Innovation, October 2016. Kathuria et al., 2017. Abdi Latif Dahir, “Internet shutdowns continue to cost Africa’s 
economies,” data from The Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa, The Atlas, 2018, 
https://theatlas.com/charts/S1LpT9ci-. 
122 Rydzak, 2018. Zittrain et al., 2017. 
123 Wagner, 2018. Kathuria et al., 2018. 
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